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Abstract
This paper presents a business cycle model with ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion encompassing the conventional New Keynesian model. Households’
ﬁnancial wealth comprises cash and interest bearing deposits. When de-
posits provide transaction services, real broad money, which is predeter-
mined, aﬀects aggregate demand and has a stabilizing impact. Monetary
policy can ensure equilibrium uniqueness if the central bank reacts at
least slightly on the real broad money gap. Moreover, if the central bank
aims at minimizing a standard loss function, real broad money enters
the interest rate reaction function. Thus, money matters if it is deﬁned
broadly enough to include all households’ ﬁnancial assets.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, E51, E41, E32.
Keywords: Interest rate policy, real broad money, ﬁnancial wealth, macroeconomic
stability.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Which role should be assigned to monetary aggregates in the conduct of monetary pol-
icy when interest rates are the central bank’s main instruments? Modern business cycle
theory, labelled the New Neoclassical Synthesis or New Keynesian Macroeconomics,
suggests that monetary aggregates can be neglected for equilibrium determination and,
therefore, as indicators for inﬂation. In this paper we show that this conclusion is not
necessarily warranted if a broad concept of money is used. We reﬁne the conventional
New Keynesian model by assuming that interest bearing deposits in addition to real
balances deliver transaction services. It will be shown that broad money substantially
aﬀects the local dynamic behavior of the economy. As a consequence, a central bank
should take care of the real broad money gap if it aims at stabilizing the economy even
if the inﬂuence of money on output and inﬂation might be quantitatively small.
Motivation This paper is motivated by empirical evidence that money signiﬁcantly
contributes to the prediction of inﬂation and consumption in the US (see, Koenig,
1990, Estrella and Mishkin, 1997, Stock and Watson, 1999, Meltzer, 1999, Nelson,
2000, Rudebusch and Svensson, 2002) and that this can also be found to be larger for
broader aggregates (see, Dotsey et al. 2000). Similar conclusions can be derived from
recent analyses of Euro area data ﬁnding that real broad money contains independent
predictive content for inﬂation rates (see, Gerlach and Svensson, 2000, Trecroci and
Vega, 2000, Altimari, 2001) and reduces uncertainty about output forecasts (see, Co-
enen et al., 2001). Remarkably, Gerlach and Svensson (2000) even ﬁnd that a real
b r o a dm o n e yg a pe n t a i l sm o r ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h i sr e g a r dt h a no u t p u tg a po rm o n e y
growth.1
A simple comparison between theoretical analyses and empirical work points to a
potential explanation for the apparently opposing conclusions concerning the role of
money. Empirical papers regularly use broad monetary aggregates, whereas theoreti-
cal models implicitly use base money. In this paper we account for this diﬀerence and
develop a business cycle model featuring inside and outside money. At the heart of
1The latter studies mostly utilize the P∗ model (see, e.g., Hallmann et al., 1991, or, von Hagen,
1995) which cannot (directly) be incorporated into business cycle theory, since, as stated by Gerlach
and Svensson, ’the microfoundations of the P∗ model are not clear’.
1our model, we assume that all ﬁnancial assets held by households provide transaction
services such that real wealth (broad money) aﬀects aggregate demand.2 While its
composition and its growth rate can freely be adjusted in every moment, the stock
of broad money denominated by the beginning-of-period price level cannot jump; the
latter being a characteristic feature of a predetermined state variable. Though, the
negligence of money is often justiﬁed by the empirical ﬁnding that the short-run re-
lation between money and inﬂation has become unstable at least in the US (e.g., by
Friedman and Kuttner, 1996), the importance of broad money for interest rate policy
in our model stems from the feature that it is an endogenous state variable. Hence,
the role of broad money does neither depend on the magnitude of the wealth eﬀect
nor on the stability of money demand.3
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of our results, we brieﬂy contrast
our approach with related work. A direct eﬀect of money on consumption can be
obtained if real balances aﬀect the marginal utility of consumption. Despite that it is
presumably theoretically incorrect to specify a model without money, the negligence
of money is viewed as a reasonable approximation (McCallum 2001; see, also, Dotsey
and Hornstein, 2000, Ireland, 2001, or Woodford, 2002a), as this eﬀect is usually
estimated to be very small. In our model, the same conclusion can be drawn if money
is identiﬁed solely with cash. However, the fact that broad money is predetermined
delivers a diﬀerent wealth eﬀect on aggregate demand that cannot be neglected for
equilibrium determination. Other justiﬁcations for a central bank to pay attention
to money have recently been put forward by Christiano and Rostagno (2001) and
Söderström (2001), emphasizing the stabilizing potential of money growth. While the
former show that switching to a money growth policy can avoid serious instabilities
which can arise for simple interest rate rules, the latter demonstrates that targeting
money can improve discretionary interest rate policy.
2The importance of wealth eﬀects on aggregate demand is recently stressed by Meltzer (1999).
An alternative channel for real wealth to aﬀect consumption and inﬂation is utilized by Leigh and
Wren-Lewis (2000) for an analysis of monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions in a sticky price model
where a positive probability of death allows for a deviation from Ricardian Equivalence.
3Evidently, not only money demand but almost any structural relation, for example the consump-
tion euler equation (see, Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997), is aﬀected by disturbances.
2Modelling broad money We develop a model with ﬁnancial intermediation nest-
ing the New Keynesian (NK) model, as, e.g., applied in Clarida et al. (1999) or
McCallum and Nelson (2000). In every period, households decide on how to divide
their stock of ﬁnancial wealth in cash and interest bearing deposits held at banks.
The outstanding role of broad money for the determination of the equilibrium stems
from two properties. First, households are endowed with an initial stock of ﬁnancial
wealth and prices are sticky such that real ﬁnancial wealth is predetermined. Second,
both components of ﬁnancial wealth , i.e., cash and deposits, are assumed to provide
transaction services.4 Consequently, aggregate demand is increasing in real wealth,
which is an endogenous state variable spanning together with exogenous variables the
state space of the economy. In contrast, NK models do not exhibit any endogenous
state variable.5 They are typically characterized by, at most, a single asset providing
transaction services, i.e., cash, and by a real bond indeterminacy such that the path
of real wealth is irrelevant for equilibrium determination.6 Furthermore, cash is reg-
ularly speciﬁed as a jump variable containing no additional information than already
provided, for example, by inﬂation or output.
Given that broad money equals ﬁnancial wealth, the fundamental solution for all
endogenous variables depends on the current value of real broad money. This also
holds for the monetary policy instrument as long as the central bank is not assumed to
follow a non-state contingent rule. Thus, we can deﬁnitely conclude that broad money
m a t t e r si nt h i sm o d e l .M o r e o v e r ,t h ei m p o r t a n c eo fb r o a dm o n e yd o e sn o tr e l yo nt h e
strength of the wealth eﬀect, as real broad money qualitatively aﬀects macroeconomic
stability, i.e., the conditions for equilibrium determinacy. The analysis contributes not
only to our particular environment, as it is isomorphic to an economy which diﬀers
from the NK model only by cash assumed to be predetermined, as, for example, in
Vegh (2001) or Buiter (2002).
4See Patinkin (1965) or, in more recent contributions, Ireland (1994), Bansal and Coleman (1996),
and Canzoneri and Diba (2000) allowing for multiple means of payment.
5To be more precisely, this is valid for models abstracting from accumulation of physical capital.
6Note that the irrelevance of real wealth is implied by the government solvency constraint satisﬁed
oﬀ equilibrium; the latter should generally be guaranteed in this class of models (see, Buiter, 2002).
3Macroeconomic stability Consider the case where the central bank sets the nom-
inal interest rate in a passive way such that the real interest rate falls with higher
inﬂation. In this case, the NK model predicts a downward sloping consumption path,
which is only consistent with convergence back to the steady state, if current consump-
tion jumps upwards and, therefore, feeds higher inﬂation. Thus, this environment al-
lows for self-fulﬁlling inﬂation expectations unless the central bank raises the nominal
interest rate by more than one for one (actively) to changes in inﬂation (see, e.g.,
Clarida et al., 1999, or Woodford, 2001). In our model the role of real broad money
changes this story. Assume that a non-fundamental shock causes agents to expect
higher inﬂation. For such a sunspot event to induce real eﬀects, output must jump in
a consistent way to ensure that the economy will return to the long-run equilibrium.
While the NK model imposes no further restriction, in our model a given value of real
broad money is only compatible with a certain relation between output, inﬂation and
the nominal interest rate in equilibrium. Hence, the fact that broad money is pre-
determined precludes multiplicity of equilibrium paths in this case such that sunspot
equilibria cannot occur.
Turning to a simple active interest rate rule, our model exhibits no stable equilib-
rium path. Recall that consumption growth is positively related to the real interest
rate. The NK model exhibits a unique stable equilibrium paths where a higher nomi-
nal and real interest rate causes consumption immediately to decline and to converge
back to its steady state value from below. In our model, a higher nominal interest
rate can only be consistent with a given amount of broad money if output is above
steady state. Hence, an equilibrium candidate would lead to an explosive behavior for
positive consumption growth.7 This can easily be avoided if the central bank reacts
to the real broad money gap. The future decline in broad money, induced by higher
nominal interest rates and inﬂation, will then lead to a decline in the real interest
rate reducing aggregate demand and causing forward looking price setters not to feed
higher inﬂation. This stabilizing mechanism only requires very small responses of the
nominal interest rate to real broad money.
7This result corresponds to ﬁndings in Benhabib et al. (2001) and Dupor (2001), showing that
activeness can lead to unstable equilibria when an additional productive asset, i.e., money in the
production function or physical capital, respectively, is introduced.
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Response of FFRATE to BASE/DFL
The VARs are estimated with quarterly U.S. data over the period 1962:1—1999:1. All variables are seasonally adjusted and, with
the exception of rates, logged. The set of included variables contains real GDP in prices of 1992 (GDP 92), the GDP deﬂator
(DFL), and the producer price index of raw materials (PPI RAW), the federal funds rate (FFRATE), and the base (BASE),
M1 (M1)o rM 2( M2) as a monetary aggregate denominated with the GDP deﬂator. The VARs contain ﬁve variables in the
order: (GDP_92, DFL, PPI_RAW, FFRATE, A), with the real monetary aggregate A ∈ {M2/DFL, M1/DFL, BASE/DFL}.
The model’s implications concerning macroeconomic stability are seemingly at odds
with empirical evidence as one frequently ﬁnds estimated interest rate policies to be
active (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 2000), but not featuring a broad monetary aggre-
gate. However, this evidence can actually be consistent with our theoretical results as
long as interest rate policy reacts at least to one endogenous variable and, therefore,
implicitly to the endogenous states. Rather then providing another interest rate rule
estimation, a straightforward reexamination of a widely-accepted vector autoregression
(VAR) should enlighten this argument. Figure 1 displays the impulse responses of the
monetary policy instrument, i.e., the federal funds rate, to an innovation to real mon-
etary aggregates derived from VARs estimated with US data using the identiﬁcation
scheme of Christiano et al. (1999). The point estimates indicate that an innovation to
real money, identiﬁed with M1 or M2 denominated with the GDP deﬂator, causes a
rise in the federal funds rate (FFRATE), the policy instrument, which is persistently
signiﬁcant for real M2 (M2/DFL) and short-lived for real M1 (M1/DFL)s h o c k s .
In accordance with our theoretical arguments, shocks to the real monetary base have
no signiﬁcant eﬀects on the federal funds rate. Thus, real broad money signiﬁcantly
aﬀects the nominal interest rate, even if it is not directly targeted by the central bank.8
Optimal policy In the last part of the paper we address the issue of optimal interest
rate policy. For this, we follow the approach of Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al.
8The latter is undoubtedly the case for the Federal Reserve, except for the period 1979-1982.
5(1999) and apply a loss function, assumed to be quadratic in inﬂation and output gap
variances, as an objective for optimal monetary policy. The ﬁrst order condition for
the optimal allocation, also known as a targeting rule (see, Svensson, 2001), is shown to
be identical to the one commonly derived in NK models. Nevertheless, when a central
bank commits itself to this targeting rule, the solution for all endogenous variables,
including the nominal interest rate, depends on the particular structure of the model.
In our model, the optimal reaction function for the nominal interest rate depends on
the real broad money gap.9 The optimal allocation is found to be associated with an
unique equilibrium path in our model, whereas in the NK model the instrument rule
demands further restrictions in order to be able to uniquely implement the targeting
rule (see, Svensson and Woodford, 1999, or Giannoni and Woodford, 2002). Simulated
losses for optimal interest rate reaction functions derived in both models indicate that
the negligence of real broad money has substantial eﬀects on cyclical ﬂuctuations.
Again, this holds regardless of the magnitude of the wealth eﬀect.
The remainder is organized as follows. The model is developed in section 2. The
long-run equilibrium and the conditions for macroeconomic stability for two versions
of the model are give in section 3. Section 4 discusses the implications for optimal
policy rules. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we develop a business cycle model with staggered price setting and
ﬁnancial intermediation. Households divide their stock of ﬁnancial wealth, which is
predetermined at the beginning of each period, into cash and deposits. Both assets
in real terms enter the utility function as a proxy for assuming that they provide
transaction services.10 Perfectly competitive banks are assumed to invest the deposited
funds in government liabilities and corporate debt. The latter are issued by perfectly
competitive ﬁrms facing a liquidity constraint which demands that wages must be
9These solutions are expressed as functions of endogenous and exogenous states which are assumed
to lie in the information set of the central bank (see, e.g., Svensson, 2001) and, therefore, diﬀer, for
example, from the forward looking speciﬁcation in Clarida et al. (1999).
10See Feenstra (1986) for the equivalence between cash-in-advance and money-in-utility
assumptions.
6paid in advance. To avoid interactions of the dynamic decisions concerned with bonds
issuance and staggered price setting, we introduce a retail sector (see, Bernanke et al.
1999). Monopolistically competitive retailer purchase the wholesale goods produced by
the ﬁrms and sell them with a mark-up to the household sector, subject to a stochastic
nominal price rigidity allowing them to adjust the ﬁnal goods prices only occasionally.
The banks hold a minimum amount of reserves with can either be interpreted as a
reserve requirement on bank deposits or a buﬀer stock of reserves held for stochastic
withdrawals caused by shocks not explicitly considered in this model. Hence, ﬁnancial
intermediaries transform bonds together with reserves into inside money.
Households Nominal variables are denoted by upper-case letters, while real vari-
ables are denoted by lower-case letters. There is a continuum of households j ∈ (0,1).
They are identically except for their speciﬁc labor endowment lj, which they supply
monopolistically in the labor market. Using that the non-labor decisions are identical
between all households, we simplify the analysis by deriving the optimal non-labor
decisions for a representative household. The indexation of households’ variables with
j is, therefore, dropped except for labor market variables. The objective of household











, with β ∈ (0,1), (1)
where β denotes the discount factor. As can be seen from the objective in (1), in-
stantaneous utility u(.) depends on consumption c, leisure 1 − lj, and real balances
mh
t ≡ Mh
t /Pt as well as real deposits dt ≡ Dt/Pt ,w h e r eMh denotes cash and D the
deposits in nominal terms and P the aggregate price level. Assumption 1 summarizes
the properties of the utility function.
Assumption 1 The utility function u(ct,1−ljt,m h
t,d t) is increasing, concave and
twice continuously diﬀerentiable with uc,u l ≡ ∂u/∂(1 − l),u m ≡ ∂u/∂mh > 0 and
ud ≥ 0; ucc,u ll,u mm < 0 and udd ≤ 0; satisﬁes i) the usual inada conditions for
ct,1 − ljt,a n dmh
t, ii) uxy =0for x 6= y with x,y ∈ {ct,1 − ljt,m h
t,d t}.
Note that employment l is constrained by 0 ≤ l<1. Two properties of the utility
function stated in assumption 1 demand some attention. First, we impose that the
utility function is separable with regard to all arguments. This restriction is not just
7introduced to simplify the calculations, but it also allows to isolate a novel channel
which causes money to matter. As recently stressed by Ireland (2001), non-separability
of the utility function can be suﬃcient to obtain a non-negligible role of the respective
monetary aggregate. In order to switch this channel oﬀ we, therefore, decided to apply
a separable utility function. Moreover, even though separability between consumption
and money might be theoretically not very satisfactory, empirical evidence indicates
that it can be regarded as a valid approximation (see, Ireland, 2001, McCallum, 2001,
Woodford, 2002a).
Second, deposits may enter the utility function. We allow for marginal utility of de-
posits to be zero in order to encompass the conventional New Keynesian model in our
framework. However, our new results concerning the role of broad money are derived
for utility being strictly concave in real deposit holdings. This crucial assumption is
introduced as a short-cut for modelling the ability of deposits to provide transactions
services. We perceive this assumption as probably more realistic than to restrain that
only cash provide transaction services, as the former asset also reduces transaction
costs either, directly, due to their usage as a means of payment or, indirectly, be-
cause of its acceptance as collateral. Accordingly, this assumption might possibly be
extended to all, at least risk-free, ﬁnancial assets of households. To give a preview,
this assumption allows to determine the stock of real broad money and, therefore, real
wealth, in equilibrium. Clearly, this is impossible in an environment where non-cash
assets are not linked to the remaining variables in the model (see also Canzoneri and
Diba, 2000).11
In each period households decide, after shocks occurred, on how to divide the
predetermined stock of ﬁnancial wealth A in holdings of money and deposits (At =
Mh
t + Dt), associated with interest earnings equal to id
tDt. Each household owns an
identical share of all productive and ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the economy. Accordingly, proﬁts
earned by banks, ﬁrms, and retailers are transferred to the households. Moreover, he
receives wage payments and a government transfer. The household’s budget constraint
11As a minor remark, it should be noted that we implicitly assume that asset markets open
after shocks occur, but close before goods market open. As recently stressed by Carlstrom and
















where wj denotes the real wage for lj, τ the real government transfer, and Ωb, Ωf,
and Ωr
t real proﬁts of banks, ﬁrms, and retailers. Maximizing the objective given
in (1) subject to the budget constraint (2), a no-ponzi-game condition for a given
initial value of total nominal wealth A0, leads to the following ﬁrst order conditions































where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (2) and πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
the gross inﬂation rate. The ﬁrst order conditions for cash and ﬁnancial wealth (4)-(5)
will play a crucial role in the subsequent analysis. Though, (5) is somehow similar to
the conventional ﬁrst order condition on bonds, it diﬀers with regard to the marginal
utility of deposits. As it will be shown in the remainder of this paper, this is the main
source for broad money to aﬀect the local dynamics of the economy. In the optimum







must also be satisﬁed; the latter providing a terminal condition for the households’
intertemporal behavior. We assume that households monopolistically supply diﬀer-
entiated labor services as in Erceg et al. (2000). Perfectly competitive units/ﬁrms
transform the diﬀerentiated labor services lj i n t oo n et y p eo fl a b o ri n p u tl,w h i c hc a n











, with ηt > 1, (7)
where ηt is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated labor services. Depart-
9ing from the common speciﬁcation, we will allow the elasticity ηt to vary (exogenously)
over time. Such variations can be interpreted as changes in the competitiveness of the
labor market lying outside the endogenous decisions considered in the model.12 When
labor aggregating units minimize costs with respect to diﬀerentiated labor services we















where w denotes the wage rate for the aggregate labor services l.G i v e nt h ed e m a n d
function for diﬀerentiated labor services (8), utility maximization implies the following





where µt denotes the markup over the perfectly competitive real wage µt =
ηt
ηt−1.
When the markup equals one (µt =1 ) the labor supply condition in (9) resembles the
case of a perfectly competitive labor market. Introducing the stochastic element, we
assume that the mark-up µ evolves according to the following stationary ﬁrst order
autoregressive process:
logµt = ρµ logµt−1+(1−ρµ)logµ+εµt, with 0 ≤ ρµ < 1 and εµt ∼ N(0,σ
2
µ). (10)
where µ denotes the steady state value, the autoregressive parameter ρµ is smaller than
one and the innovations εµ are i.i.d.. Allowing for exogenous changes in the mark-up,
the model provides a source for shocks raising the costs of ﬁnal goods producing
ﬁrms, the so-called cost-push shocks, which will be essential in the analysis of optimal
monetary policy.
Financial Intermediation Intermediaries are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
They take deposits from households paying a nominal return id. These deposited funds
D are invested in government liabilities, i.e., money Mb and bonds Bb,a n di nc o r p o r a t e
bonds Bc. I ne a c hp e r i o dp r o ﬁts Ωb
t are transferred to households being the owners
12For example, a decline in ηt leads to an exogenous increase in the competitiveness reducing the
market power of the supply side.





















where i (ic) denotes the nominal interest rate on government (corporate) bonds. We
assume that the central bank imposes a minimum reserve requirement on deposits
which is aimed to ensure the liquidity in the intermediary sector. To put this regulatory
measure in the context of the model’s feature that deposits provide transaction services,
we implicitly assume that agents perceive the fulﬁllment of the reserve requirement as
a prerequisite for accepting deposits as a means of payment. The reserve requirement
on deposits is governed by a constant rate θ, with 0 ≤ θ < 1:
M
b
t ≥ θDt. (12)
Actually, there is no endogenous justiﬁcation for cash holdings of ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries. Though, in several countries reserve requirements are already eliminated, they
still play a non-negligible role in the conduct of monetary policy in several countries.
However, cash holdings of ﬁnancial intermediaries can also be rationalized without re-
lying on such a regulation. For example, banks can voluntarily hold a certain amount
of reserves to be prepared for unexpected withdrawals.13 W ef u r t h e ri m p o s et h a tt h e
















−1 ≥ 0. (13)
We assume that intermediaries maximize the present discounted value of future stream
of real proﬁts weighted by the marginal utility of consumption because each interme-
diary is owned by the households. The banks maximization problem is constrained by
13This could, for example, be implemented by considering events, which induce households to
withdraw their intermediated funds and do not interact with other economic decisions of agents,
occurring with a probability θ (see Shreft and Smith, 2000).












s.t. (11) and (12). (14)
As we assumed that ﬁnancial intermediaries are perfectly competitive, they take the
interest rates on bonds and deposits as given. The ﬁrst order conditions for money,
bonds, and deposit holdings are then given by:
i
d
t =it(1 − θ), (15)
ψt(M
b
t − θDt)=0, ψt ≥ 0,M
b


























and the solvency constraint (13) holding with equality. The variable ψ denotes the
Kuhn-Tucker multiplier referring to the minimum reserve requirement (12). With
positive values of λ and the central bank setting a strictly positive nominal interest rate
(see below), it can be seen from (16) and (19) that the minimum reserve requirement
will be binding in equilibrium: Mb
t = θDt.
Production sector A continuum of identical and perfectly competitive ﬁrms pro-




t = lt. (20)
In order to provide a reasonable purpose for corporate debt, the ﬁrms are assumed to
f a c eal i q u i d i t yc o n s t r a i n tw h i c hd e m a n d st h a tt h ew a g eb i l ls h o u l db ep a i di na d v a n c e .
They meet this ﬁnancial demand by the issuance of bonds Bc:
B
c
t ≥ wtlt. (21)
Firms sell the wholesale good to retailers at a competitive price Pw,a n dh i r et h e
aggregate labor input at the economy wide price level P, which will be deﬁned below.
Hence, ﬁrms’ proﬁts Ω
f
t, which are lump-sum transferred to the owners (households),











t + Ptwtlt + PtΩ
f
t. (22)
For the remainder of this paper it is convenient to deﬁne a mark-up of the economy
wide price level P over the wholesale price: µPt = Pt/P w
t . Firms are further restricted









−1 ≤ 0. (23)
The ﬁrms are assumed to maximize the present discounted value of future stream of
real proﬁts weighted by the marginal utility of consumption subject to the liquidity












s.t. (22) and (21),
delivering the following ﬁrst order conditions for labor demand and for the issuance of
corporate bonds:
















t − Ptwtlt)=0 , δt ≥ 0,B
c
t − Ptwtlt ≥ 0, (26)
where the real marginal costs of a ﬁrm mc is the inverse of the mark-up µp : mct =
1/µpt. Furthermore, the solvency constraint (23) holds with equality in the ﬁrm’s
optimum. It can immediately be seen from the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order condition for bonds
(25) and from the banks’ optimal demand for corporate bonds (17), that the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier on the liquidity constraint δ will be equal to zero in equilibrium.
Hence, the labor demand condition (24) will, therefore, take a conventional form,
wt = mct, in equilibrium.
Retail sector The ﬁnal consumption good is an aggregate of a continuum of diﬀeren-
tiated goods supplied by monopolistically competitive retailer indexed with i ∈ (0,1).
They buy the wholesale good from the production sector. After the wholesale good
13is diﬀerentiated, a retailer i sells an amount yi of diﬀerentiated goods charging an
individual price Pi with the mark-up µip.T h e ﬁnal good y is obtained by a CES










, with ²>1, (27)
where y is the number of units of the ﬁnal good, yi the amount sold by retailer i,
and ² the constant elasticity of substitution between these diﬀerentiated goods. Let
Pi and P denote the price of good i set by retailer i and the price index for the
ﬁnal good. The demand for each diﬀerentiated good is derived by minimizing the
total costs of obtaining y subject to (27), analogous to the labor demand condition
(8): yit =( Pit/Pt)







We introduce a nominal rigidity in form of staggered price setting as developed by
Calvo (1983). In each period, retailer may reset their prices with the probability 1−φ
independent of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ of retailer
are assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the following simple
rule: Pit = πPit−1, where π denotes the average of the inﬂation rate πt = Pt/Pt−1.
The derivation of the ﬁrst order condition of the price setters is provided in appendix
6.1. The linear approximation of the corresponding aggregate supply constraint at a
stationary state is given by
b πt = χc mc + βEt[b πt+1], with χ =( 1− φ)(1− βφ)φ
−1, (28)
where b x denotes the percent deviation from the steady state value x : b x =l o g ( xt) −
log(x). This forward looking optimal pricing schedule, which is commonly applied in
monetary business cycle models, is also known as the ’New Keynesian Phillips’ curve.
Public sector The public sector consists of two parts, the monetary authority and
the ﬁscal authority. The ﬁscal authority receives funds by issuing one period risk-free
bonds which pay an interest rate i. It uses lump-sum transfers to balance the ﬂow
budget constraint after the monetary authority transfers receipts from money creation.
The consolidated budget constraint is given by
Bt+1 + Mt+1 =( 1+it)Bt + Mt + Ptτt,
14We further demand the monetary and ﬁscal policy regime to satisfy the following







−1 =0 . (29)
In the recent literature (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001, or Buiter, 2002) such a policy
regime is also called Ricardian.
The monetary authority is assumed to control the short-run nominal interest rate
on government bonds i. It sets a stationary sequence for the gross short run nominal
interest rate {R}∞
t=0 where Rt is deﬁned as Rt ≡ 1+it > 1 ∀t. In the subsequent
analysis we introduce several forms of monetary policy rules where the interest rate is
allowed to be set contingent on endogenous variables (‘instrument rules’). We further
derive interest rate rules, which support loss function minimizing plans (‘targeting
rules’), as functions of endogenous and exogenous state variables.
Rational expectation equilibrium Markets for labor, assets, and goods clear in
equilibrium. The state space is spanned by the exogenous state variable µt and the
single endogenous state variable at = At/Pt−1.
Deﬁnition 1 Given the initial stock of households’ ﬁnancial wealth A1, the initial
price level P0 and the process for the exogenous state (10), a rational expectation equilib-
rium is an allocation {ct(at,µ t),l t(at,µ t),m h
t(at,µ t),m b
t(at,µ t),m t(at,µ t),d t(at,µ t),
bc
t(at,µ t),b t(at,µ t),y t(at,µ t),a t+1(at,µ t)}∞
t=0, and a set of sequences for prices and
costates {wt(at,µ t), πt(at,µ t), ψt(at,µ t), δt(at,µ t), λt(at,µ t),i d
t(at,µ t),i c
t(at,µ t),m c t(at,µ t),
Rt(at,µ t)}∞
t=0 satisfying
• the households’ ﬁrst order conditions (3)-(5) and (9),
• the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions (24) − (26), the aggregate production function
(yt = lt), and the solvency constraint (23) holding with equality,
• the aggregate supply constraint (28),
• the banks’ ﬁrst order conditions (15)-(19) and the solvency constraint holding
with equality (13),
• the interest rate policy Rt(at,µ t) with E0 (Rt)= ¯ R and Rt − 1 > 0 ∀t and the
government solvency constraint (29),
• markets for money (Mt = Mh
t + Mb
t) and goods (Ptyt = Ptct) clear,
15• and the transversality condition (6).
Using that the reserve requirement is binding as λt and it are always strictly larger
than zero, the ﬁrst order conditions (16) and (18) can be combined to a binding
reserve requirement: Mt = θDt. Hence, the equilibrium values of all assets can be
determined, except for bonds. The latter property, which is also known as ‘real bonds
indeterminacy’ (Canzoneri and Diba, 2000), is in common with conventional business
cycle models where the policy regime is solvent, implying a ‘debt neutrality’ (see, also,
Buiter, 2002).
Further, it should be noted that the transversality condition (6) and the government
solvency constraint (29) do not coincide in equilibrium. This feature, which stands in
contrast to a respective identity, e.g., in NK models, comes from the fact that ﬁnancial
wealth generally diﬀers from the stock of government liabilities because banks also hold
corporate bonds. Nevertheless, since public policy as well as banks’ and ﬁrms’ behavior
is assumed to satisfy the solvency constraints (13), (23), and (29), the paths of the
ﬁscal policy instruments, i.e., lump-sum transfers and bond issuance, do not matter
for equilibrium determination.
3 Instrument rules and macroeconomic stability
In this section, we focus on the implications of interest rate setting on macroeconomic
stability. To be more precisely, we are interested in the conditions for instrument rules
to ensure a unique rational expectation equilibrium path. As indeterminate equilibria
allow for ﬂuctuations due to non-fundamental phenomena, equilibrium determinacy
can be interpreted as a prerequisite for optimal monetary policies. In order to facilitate
comparisons with the existing literature, we make use of the fact that the model nests
the NK model as a special case.
Two versions of the model In monetary business cycle models, deposits are com-
monly not explicitly considered. This can be resembled in our model if the utility
function is independent of real deposit holdings (ud,u dd =0 ) and if banks are not re-
stricted by a reserve requirement (θ =0 ). Under these speciﬁc assumptions, deposits
equals bonds and do not aﬀect any other variable in equilibrium (see below). In the
16remainder of the paper we will call this the C model as a mnemonic for the property
that this version is equivalent to a Conventional New Keynesian model. As the dy-
namic properties of the C model are already elaborately analyzed (see, e.g., Woodford,
2002b) in the literature, we are primarily interested in the case where deposits do pro-
vide transaction services (hence, ud > 0 and udd < 0) while a minimum liquidity in the
banking sector is assured by a strictly positive reserve requirement (θ > 0). We will
call this the B version of the model referring to the property that real Broad money
aﬀects the remaining variables in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 The B version (C version) of the model is characterized by a rational
expectations equilibrium given in deﬁnition 1 and by θ,u d > 0 and udd < 0 (θ,u d,
udd =0 ).
The crucial diﬀerence between these two versions is that the equilibrium value of real
deposits is linked to the remaining variables in the B model, whereas its equilibrium
value cannot be determined in the C model. It might be worth mentioning that the
distinction between the two versions does not depend on the degree in which deposits
help to facilitate transactions. Hence, the B version is valid even if the marginal utility
of deposits becomes very small. In other words, the C version cannot be interpreted as
a limiting case of the B model in which limud → 0. Given that the equilibrium values
of both deposits and government bonds cannot be pinned down in the C model, this
version exhibits a real broad money indeterminacy and, therefore, also a real wealth
indeterminacy. Thus, a unique equilibrium in the C model is compatible with multiple
sequences for real ﬁnancial wealth. In contrast, both components of real broad money
aﬀect the consumption path in the B model, as can be seen from the households ﬁrst
order conditions (4) and (5). Nevertheless, our model predicts that output and inﬂation
are independent of monetary aggregates in the long run equilibrium. The main long
run properties of both versions are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given that the interest rate policy is stationary, the long run equilib-
rium
1. in both versions of the model is characterized by i) unique stationary values of
output, production, consumption and wages which are independent of monetary
policy, ii) unique stationary values of inﬂation, real balances and interest rates
17for deposits, and iii) a steady state inﬂation rate rising in the stationary value
of the nominal interest rate, while
2. in the B version the long run equilibrium is further characterized by i) unique
stationary values for real deposits, real reserves and real broad money, and by
ii) real deposits, its interest rate and real broad money as decreasing functions of
the reserve requirement ratio θ, and reserves increasing in θ if −
uddd
ud > 1.
Proof. See appendix 6.2.
Hence, the long run properties of both versions of the model are identical with respect
to output and inﬂation. It should be emphasized that 1i) holds regardless of the
restrictions on interest rate policy. Furthermore, the B model predicts that real broad
money declines when the monetary stance is permanently tightened by a rise in the
reserve requirement ratio θ. I nc o m m o nw i t ht h eN Km o d e l ,ap e r m a n e n tr i s ei n
the nominal interest rate just raises the stationary inﬂation rate in both versions of
our model. The fact that permanent changes in the stock of broad money leaves
output and inﬂation unaﬀected will be exploited in the following. In particular, the
linear approximation of the model at the long run equilibrium provides a framework in
which the B model diﬀers from the C version just with regard to one static equilibrium
condition.
Local dynamics of the linearized model In the remainder of this section, we in-
vestigate the restrictions on monetary policy which guarantee the existence of a unique
and stable equilibrium. We consider interest rate policies in form of instrument rules,
i.e., we assume that the nominal interest rate on government bonds is a ‘simple func-
tion of a small subset of the information available to the central bank’ (see, Svensson,
2001). The local dynamic properties of the model are analyzed for a utility function
satisfying assumption 1 with constant elasticities of substitution, i.e., ux
uxxx = − 1
σx, with
σx ≥ 1 for x = c,1 − l,mh, a n di nt h eB version also for x = d. We further assume
that elasticity of substitution for both assets is identical (σm = σd = σ). Linearizing
the equilibrium conditions at the steady state leads to the following three equations
for the B model (see appendix 6.3) governing the rational expectations equilibrium
18paths for inﬂation, output and real broad money:14






Et b Rt+1, (30)
b πt =βEtb πt+1 + γb yt + χb µt, (31)
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b Rt. (32)
The C model consists just of the ﬁrst two equations, the so-called forward looking
IS curve and the New Keynesian Phillips curve. This can immediately be seen from
the ﬁrst order conditions for deposits and bonds being identical for θ,u d,u dd =0(see
equation 5 and 17) and by recalling that real bonds are always indetermined. There-
fore, equation (32), which is derived from the ﬁrst order conditions of money deposits
and bonds (4), (5), and (17), just enters the B model. It provides an equilibrium
condition relating real broad money holdings to current values of output and the nom-
inal interest rate on bonds. Noticing that real broad money at is already given at the
beginning of period t, it can be interpreted as households willing to raise consumption
when their real broad money holdings exceed the steady state value. This eﬀect is
even more pronounced for higher nominal interest rates, as this raises the opportunity
cost of non-bond assets and, therefore, reduces the willingness to hold broad money.
It should further be noted that broad money is denominated in the previous period
price level, at = At/Pt−1, such that a decline in inﬂation works expansionary because
it leads to a rise in the current period real value of broad money, At/Pt, which actually
reduces transaction costs.
On a ﬁrst sight, the equilibrium condition on real broad money resembles a con-
ventional ﬁrst order condition for cash. However, the ﬁrst two equations cannot
be separated from this contemporaneous wealth equation, since real broad money
at = At/Pt−1 i sap r e d e t e r m i n e ds t a t ev a r i a b l ei nt h i sm o d e l .T h i sp o i n t sa tac r u c i a l
diﬀerence between narrow and broad money. Narrow money (cash) is a jump variable
in the model such that one can separately solve for its equilibrium path.15 Hence, we
14The parameter γ is deﬁned as: γ = χω1,w i t hω1 ≡ (σn
l
1−l + σc).
15Note, however, that money could in principle also be treated as an predetermined variable. More
excactly, this would require the very special assumption that asset markets open after good markets
close given that beginning-of-period real balances enter the utility function.
19can ignore cash holdings for an analysis of inﬂation and output. Evidently, real ﬁnan-
cial wealth is always predetermined. The diﬀerence between both models is that real
ﬁnancial wealth, which equals real broad money, is linked to the remaining variables
(π,y)i nt h eB model, whereas it is irrelevant for the determination of the equilibrium
in the C model. Consequently, in the latter model there is no analogue to the equi-
librium condition for real ﬁnancial wealth (32). The following proposition summarizes
the local dynamic properties of the C model with a state-contingent instrument rule
featuring future inﬂation as the single argument.
Proposition 2 In the C model given by (30) and (31) with an interest rate policy
described by b Rt = ρπb πt, there exists a unique rational expectation equilibrium path
converging to the steady state of the economy iﬀ




If (33) does not hold, there exists a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to the
steady state.
Proof. See appendix 6.4 or Woodford (2002b).
The properties of the C model summarized in proposition 2 are clearly not new and
correspond to the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) and Woodford (2002a,b). The
main result, the so-called Taylor-principle, is that the C model, which exhibits only
jump variables, demands activeness of monetary policy (ρπ > 1) in order to rule out
multiple rational expectation equilibrium paths. The well-known mechanism, which
is responsible for this property, will be brieﬂy described below in a comparison with
the determinacy conditions in the B model. The qualiﬁcation to the Taylor principle,
which is inherent in (33), just excludes hyperactive policies as the upper bound on
ρπ is very large for any reasonable parametrization (see also Clarida et al., 1999, or
Woodford, 2002b).
Turning to the B model, we now have to consider that real broad money is, by
(32), linked to output and inﬂation such that the model features a non-negligible pre-
determined endogenous state variable changing the conditions for interest rate rules to
ensure equilibrium determinacy. While activeness is necessary for equilibrium unique-
ness in the C model, this is not valid in the B model, where indeed passive rules are
20associated with determinacy and activeness destabilizes the economy. In this case, a
uniquely determined stable equilibrium can be restored if the central bank also reacts
to changes in the stock of real broad money when setting its instrument. In this re-
spect, reacting to the real broad money gap might help stabilizing the economy. Our
ﬁndings are presented more formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the B model given by (30) to (32) with an interest rate policy
described by
b Rt = ρπb πt + ρab at, with ρπ,ρa > 0,
there exists a unique rational expectation equilibrium path converging to the steady
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Proof. See appendix 6.5.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from this proposition. First, if a central bank
does not react on broad money, it is suﬃcient for determinacy to set interest rates in
a passive way (ρπ < 1). Evidently, this implies that an interest rate peg, Rt = R ∀ t,
is associated with equilibrium determinacy. This result clearly stands in contrast to
the conventional view that an interest rate peg leads to indeterminacy. On the other
hand, it accords to the results recently derived for modiﬁcations of the NK model
allowing for productive assets, like physical capital (see, Dupor, 2001) or money in
the production function (see, Benhabib et al., 2001). These models further predict, as
the B model, that an active interest rate policy (ρπ > 1, ρa =0 ) leads to an unstable
equilibrium. Note that in our model this feature holds unless policy is hyperactive
(see, 35). The second main implication from proposition 3 is concerned with the role
of real broad money as an argument of the instrument rule. A further inspection of
the determinacy condition reveals that reacting on the real broad money gap increases
the likelihood that the equilibrium is determinate for active rules, if the expression in






1−φ then there exists for each interest rate rule with ρπ > 1
one e ρa > 0 such that any interest rate rule with ρa > e ρa ensures determinacy.
Proof. See appendix 6.6.
It should be noted that the condition stated in corollary 2 is not necessary. But
already the suﬃcient condition will always hold for any reasonable parametrization,
as it would be violated only if a very high degree of price stickiness is associated with
av e r yh i g hs t e a d ys t a t ei n ﬂation. Consider, as an example, a rule with ρπ =1 .5 as
originally proposed by Taylor (1993). Setting the parameter values, listed below in
table 1, in accordance with related studies, we arrive at e ρa equal to 0.011. Hence, even
a small responsiveness of interest rates on deviation in real broad money is suﬃcient
to guarantee the existence of a unique rational expectation equilibrium path.
What are the reasons for the determinacy conditions in proposition 3? We start
the discussion with the case of a passive interest rate rule (ρπ < 1) which is regularly
associated with multiple equilibrium paths in NK models (see, Benhabib et al., 2001,
or Woodford, 2001). In the C version inﬂation expectations can be self-fulﬁlling, as
higher inﬂation lowers the real interest rate inducing households to postpone savings
such that increased aggregate demand causes ﬁrms to raise prices. In this case, the C
model allows for multiple equilibrium paths such that arbitrary inﬂation expectations
can force the economy out of its long run equilibrium. In the B model the existence of
multiple equilibrium paths are ruled out due to the existence of the real broad money
condition (32). From all equilibrium sequences that are compatible with (30) and (31)
for a passive rule, equation (32) selects the single candidate which is compatible with
the predetermined value for real broad money at = At/Pt−1. Hence, the B model
exhibits unique equilibrium sequences for the triplet (π,y,a).
The economic reason for this stabilizing role of real broad money in the B model
stems from the fact that both of its components provide transaction services to the
households. A rise in inﬂation lowers broad money denominated by the current price
level (Mh
t + Dt)/Pt. In order to satisfy the equilibrium condition (32), output has to
jump to a certain amount which, in general, is not identical to the amount needed to
feed the higher inﬂation we started with. Consequently, non-fundamentally induced
changes in expectations cannot cause aggregate demand and inﬂa t i o nt oj u m po n
22impact as predicted by the C model. Now consider the case where the central bank
raises the nominal interest rate by more than one for one to changes in inﬂation in
the B model, but does not react on broad money (ρπ > 1, ρa =0 ). A rise in inﬂation
is then associated with a higher real interest rate leading to a positive growth rate of
output (see, 30). The real wealth condition (32) demands, again for at predetermined,
that output rises above its steady state value as the sum of the remaining two variables
on the right hand side of (32) clearly decreases for an active rule. Given the positive
output growth and that the upward jump in output enforces the rise in inﬂation, the
economy evolves on a explosive path.
Why can the central bank restore macroeconomic stability in the B model with an
active policy if it reacts suﬃciently to changes in real broad money? In order to answer
this question, we have to take the ﬁrst order condition for broad money in subsequent
periods into consideration. It predicts that households will adjust their broad money
holdings downwards, as long as they expect a rise in future interest rates exceeding a
potential rise in output and inﬂation. Evidently, the latter would be the case for an
active interest rate policy. Hence, if the central bank reacts to the decline in real broad
money by lowering the nominal interest rate, it induces a decline in the real interest
rate and, therefore, in consumption growth in the subsequent periods, thereby, ruling
out explosive behavior.
4O p t i m a l m o n e t a r y p o l i c y
In this section, we examine the role of real broad money for optimal interest rate
policy. Applying numerical methods we solve for the optimal allocations in the B
and the C model. As expected, the fundamental solutions (reaction functions) for the
monetary policy instrument diﬀer with regard to the appearance of real broad money.
We further ﬁnd that the optimal allocation is uniquely determined in the B model and
indeterminate in the C model. In order to assess the importance of broad money for
optimal monetary policy, we compute realized losses for diﬀerent instrument reaction
functions in the B model.16 The results indicate that the negligence of a predetermined
16Similar comparisons between diﬀerent policies on basis of numerically derived losses for variants
of the C model are provided by McCallum and Nelson (2000) and Woodford (1999b).
23variable, here, real broad money, can have substantial eﬀects on the performance of
interest rate policy.
Flexible inﬂation targeting G i v e nt h a ta no p t i m a lm o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o u l dm a x -
imize welfare, the central bank’s objective should be based on the households lifetime
utility given in (1). However, in order to facilitate comparisons with related work,
we assume that the central bank’s objective is to stabilize the economy. We assume
that the central bank aims at minimizing an intertemporal loss function representing
the objective of a central bank which is engaged in a ﬂexible interest rate targeting as



















This loss function can be interpreted as a second-order Taylor approximation to the
expected utility of the representative consumer.17 For this approximation to be valid,
it is implicitly assumed that the distortions due to monopolistic competition in the
goods market and due to the steady state distortion of monopolistic wage setting
are eliminated by the ﬁscal authority through an appropriate system of lump-sum
transfers. Moreover, we assume the steady state gross inﬂation to be one. It should
further be noted that output deviations instead of output gap deviations enter the loss
function for convenience. While in general these measures are not identical whenever
the potential output level departs from the actual output, they only diﬀer by unequal
steady state values in our environment.
The central bank chooses a sequence of interest rates and a sequence of private
sector allocations in order to maximize (36), taking the sequence of private sector
equilibrium conditions (30), (31), and (32) as constraints. The central bank does not
re-optimize each period, or in other words, we derive the optimal interest rate policy
under commitment (see, Clarida et al., 1999, or, Woodford, 1999a).18 The following
proposition summarizes the outcome of the policy problem.
17For a formal derivation, see Woodford (2002c).
18Since the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) it is well known that monetary policy
might face a time-consistency problem. Here, we do not investigate the issue of implementation.
24Proposition 4 The optimal policy under commitment
1. in the B model is characterized by a set of sequences for the endogenous vari-
ables (π,y,a,R) satisfying the equilibrium conditions (30), (31), (32), and the
following targeting and initial rules:
b yt − b yt−1 =−
γ
α





2. in the C model is characterized by a set of sequences for the endogenous variables
(π,y,R) satisfying the equilibrium conditions (30), (31), and the targeting rule
(37) and the initial rule (38).
Proof. See appendix 6.7.
Remarkably, the so-called targeting rule (37), which repeatedly appears in the litera-
ture on inﬂation targeting (see, e.g., Clarida et al., 1999, or Svensson, 2001), is identical
in both versions of our model. As shown in the proof, this is due to the fact that the
aggregate supply constraint (31) is the single binding condition for the optimality
problem such that the shadow prices on all equilibrium conditions and, particularly,
on the ﬁrst order condition for broad money (32) are equal to zero. Nevertheless, the
implied fundamental solution (reaction function) for the nominal interest rate diﬀers
between the B and the C model because real broad money enters the solution only in
the B model. The optimality condition (37) indicates a path dependence of optimal
monetary policy such that past values of output are also treated as predetermined
state variables (see, Woodford, 1999a). The initial rule (38), in fact, diﬀers from the
general targeting rule (37) because values of output prior to period t0 do not inﬂuence
output and inﬂation between t0 and inﬁnity. However, in the sequel we will ignore the
fact that the ﬁrst-order conditions diﬀer at the point in time when the central bank
implements its optimal plan. This is closely related to adopting the so called timeless
perspective of optimal policy investigated by Woodford (1999a,b) and McCallum and
Nelson (2000).19 While the fundamental solution for the nominal interest rates can
19The term timeless perspective stands for the assumption that the central bank behaves as if it
implemented its optimal policy plan inﬁnitely many periods ago. For details of this concept see,
especially, Woodford (1999b).
25easily be derived in the case of the C model (see, appendix 6.8 or Clarida et al., 1999),
we rely on numeric methods to examine optimal interest rate policies for the B model.
Table 1 Values for structural parameters
Parameter σ, σc, σl ² β l 1 − φ πσ µ ρµ α
Values 2 6 0.99 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.005 0.9 (0) 0.3 (0.5)
A quantitative analysis In order to solve numerically for the optimal allocation
and the corresponding interest rates, the B model is calibrated at the steady state
by taking parameter values corresponding to related literature and roughly matching
their empirical counterparts (see table 1). The length of a time period is one-quarter.
We solve for the optimal allocation in the B model and the C model using Blanchard
and Kahn’s (1983) solution method. The B model contains the three conditions (30)-
(32) as well as the targeting rule (37) such that the nominal interest rate is now an
endogenous variable. In case of our B model, the state space is spanned by the exoge-
nous state b µt,t h es t o c ko fr e a lb r o a dm o n e yb at, and the previous value of output b yt−1.
In contrast, the C model does not include real broad money, so that the state space
just consists of b µt and b yt−1. In accordance with our analytical results of the previous
section, we ﬁnd that the optimal allocation is associated with a unique equilibrium
in the B model, whereas we obtain multiple rational expectations equilibrium paths
for optimal policy in the C model; the latter ﬁn d i n gi sa l s or e p o r t e di nS v e n s s o na n d
Woodford (1999).20
Finally, we calculate the realized losses in the B model using diﬀerent interest
rate reaction functions. The ﬁrst reaction function, which is called B1 policy, is the
fundamental solution for the interest rate in the optimal allocation derived above.
The second reaction function is the optimal interest rate of the C model, called C
policy. This experiment can be interpreted as a sensible rule for a central bank that
erroneously ignores the inﬂuence of broad money on the economy. Note that such a
central bank might not detect that it is using the wrong model because the B model
20For further restriction on optimal policy rules to ensure determinacy see Giannoni and Woodford
(2002).
26nests the C version as shown in the previous section. As a third policy, labelled B2,
we apply an interest rate reaction function derived in the B m o d e lf o rt h ec a s ew h e r e
the targeting rule in (37) is replaced by the static condition: αb yt = −γb πt.21
Table 2 Losses in the B model for diﬀerent interest rate reaction functions
Values for Interest rate policy Values for Interest rate policy
ρµ =0 .9 α B1 B2 C ρµ =0 α B1 B2 C
0.3 0.13 0.66 10.8 0.3 0.0038 0.006 0.32
0.5 0.21 0.71 5.18 0.5 0.0043 0.0065 0.11
Notes: reported value are means of realized losses times 104
The means of realized losses presented in table 1 are estimated using 1000 identical
realizations for the innovations to the cost push shock process (10). The realized
losses for the C policy are always much higher for persistent (ρµ =0 .9)t h a nf o r
transitory shocks (ρµ =0 ). The diﬀerences in the performance of the B1 and the
B2 policy are quite modest and broadly comparable with the ﬁndings in McCallum
and Nelson (2000). The presence of the additional state variable, at,i sr e s p o n s i b l ef o r
interest rate responses to cost push shocks being always much less pronounced for the
B1 and B2 policy than for the C policy. The inferior performance of the C policy,
which is worsened for a smaller weight on output gap, α =0 .3, indicates that strong
interest rate responses increase output and, especially, inﬂation ﬂuctuations caused
by the wealth eﬀect of broad money adjustments. This demonstrates that applying
the targeting rule (37) in the ‘wrong’ (C) model is worse than applying the inferior
targeting rule (αb yt = −γb πt) in the ‘right’ (B)m o d e l .
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper it was shown that real broad money can have a substantial eﬀect on
macroeconomic stability. When households’ wealth consists of inside and outside
21This condition is can be found in the literature for the case that the central bank does not commit
itself to a once and for all policy, but is allowed to re-optimize in every period (see, e.g., Clarida et
al. 1999). It can easily be shown that this rule corresponds to the optimal interests policy under
discretion also in our model B.
27money, real broad money equals total ﬁnancial wealth, which is a predetermined vari-
able. As both components of broad money, i.e., cash and deposits, provide transac-
tion services, real wealth aﬀects aggregate demand. A stable equilibrium can always
uniquely be determined as long as the central bank reacts, at least slightly, on the real
broad money gap. Therefore, this model is less vulnerable to undesirable dynamics
due to multiple or unstable equilibria than more conventional monetary business cycle
models. Moreover, real broad money is found to enter an optimal interest rate reaction
function of a central bank which aims at minimizing a standard loss function. It is
further demonstrated that the negligence of real broad money due to model misper-
ception leads to considerably higher losses. Remarkably, the arguments for real broad
money to be non-negligible are independent of the strength of the wealth eﬀect as they
build on the property of real broad money as an endogenous state variable.
The model developed in this paper, clearly, exhibits several simplifying assump-
tion, such as a separable utility function, the negligence of capital accumulation, or
households having no direct access to bonds. Nevertheless, the underlying real wealth
eﬀect does not depend on these assumptions and operates as long as all ﬁnancial assets
held by households raise aggregate demand via the reduction of transaction services.
In this case, a central bank should react to changes in a broadly deﬁned real monetary
aggregate serving as a proxy for real ﬁnancial wealth.
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6.1 Derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
In each period a measure 1−φ of randomly selected retailer set new prices e Pit in order
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where mc is the inverse of the retailer’s mark-up µP.S i n c et h er e t a i lﬁrms are owned
by the households, the weights ϑt,t+s of dividend payments depends on the marginal




Pt+s.T h e ﬁrst order condition for the optimal


















Using a simple price rule for the fraction φ of the retailer (Pit = πPit−1), the price
index for the ﬁnal good Pt evolves recursively over time. In a symmetric equilibrium we
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where b x denotes the percent deviation of x from its steady state value x. Linearization
of (40) at the steady state leads to:
φ
1 − φ
b πt = b e Pqt.( 4 1 )



































































s Et [b πt,t+s + c mct+s]. (44)
Taking the period t +1version of (44) times βφ and substracting from (44), gives:
φ
(1 − φ)
(b πt − βφEt [b πt+1]) = (1 − βφ)
Ã




s Et [−b πt+1]
!
. (45)
Rewriting equation (45) leads to the ’New Keynesian Phillips Curve’ (28):
b πt = χc mct + βEt [b πt+1], with χ =( 1− φ)(1− βφ)φ
−1.
6.2 Proof of proposition 1
The claims made in the proposition can easily be derived from stationary equilib-
rium conditions. Combining the ﬁrst order condition for labor supply (9) with the
resource constraint, mc/µ = ul(1−c)/uc(c), uniquely determines the stationary value
of consumption and output. The production function and the labor supply condition
(9) then uniquely determine labor and output. The stationary inﬂation rate is deter-
mined by the interest rate policy given in deﬁnition 1 and the ﬁrst order condition
for bonds (17) at the steady state, π = ¯ Rβ. Combining the steady state expres-
sions of the household’s ﬁrst order conditions steady state (3), (4), and (5) with FOC
on bonds for the banks (17) gives um(mh)=uc(c)(R − 1). The FOC’s of the bank
then yield: ¯ id =( 1− θ)(R − 1), and ¯ ic =( R − 1). Combining (3), (4), (5) and (17)





and mb = θd. It can be immediately seen that in the B model ∂d/∂θ,
∂a/∂θ, and ∂i
d/∂θ are strictly negative, and that ∂mb/∂θ = d + umθ/udd is strictly
30positive if −uddd/ud > 1.T h i sc o m p l e t e st h ep r o o f .
6.3 Reduction of the model
In this appendix, we derive the linearized reduced form model used in section 3 and
4. To save on notation, values without subscript denote steady state values in this



























udddEtb dt+1 = ucEt
³










Applying certainty equivalence leads to
udddb dt = uc
³










−σcb ct = b λt. (47)
Linearizing (4), using the steady state condition λ = uc and inserting (47) leads to
−σumb m
h




d − 1)σcb ct. (48)










and using the steady state condition um = uc (R − 1), see proof of proposition 1, we










The term money demand function is used in a slightly abused form, as we also used
aF O Co ft h eﬁnancial intermediaries to obtain this equilibrium condition. Similarly,




, into (46) leads to a deposit demand function
b dt = −
1
σ
Rb Rt − Rd b Rd
t




Linearizing the deﬁnition of broad money gives









Inserting demand for cash and deposits leads to













Rb Rt − Rd b Rd
t








t = θ+(1− θ)Rt and Rd b Rd
t =( 1− θ)Rb Rt and using the market clearing
condition yt = ct yields the equilibrium condition for real broad money (32)























b yt + b µt = ω1b yt + b µt.
Inserting into the linearized price equation (28), we obtain the forward looking Phillips
curve.
b πt = χω1b yt + βEt[b πt+1]+χb µt. (49)
Finally, combining the ﬁrst order condition on bank demand for deposits with the ﬁrst-
order condition on consumptions and using market clearing and leads, after linearizing,
to the standard IS curve.





b Rt+1 − b πt+1
i
(50)
326.4 Proof of Proposition 2




















This forward-looking system is determinate if both eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle.















Hence, for passive rules (ρπ < 1) we will have one eigenvalue between zero and one
and one eigenvalue larger than one, implying indeterminacy. As
∂f(X)
∂X =2 X −1−β +
γ
σc (ρπ − 1) is positive for active rules (ρπ > 1)i fX ≥ 1, there is no eigenvalue larger
than 1 for active rules. To rule out indeterminacy for active rules, we ﬁrst investigate
whether f (−1) > 0
f (−1) = 2 + 2β −
γ
σc





Hence, we have one eigenvalue smaller than −1 and one between −1 and 0 if ρπ >
1+σc
γ 2(1+β), implying indeterminacy. Finally, to rule out two eigenvalues smaller
than −1 (explosive behavior), we investigate whether
∂f(X)
∂X is negative at −1 when
f (−1) > 0
∂f (X)
∂X
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
X=−1
= −3 − β −
γ
σc





33As (3 + β) > 2(1+β), we can rule out explosive equilibria. Hence, we have a unique
rational equilibrium path converging to the steady state if and only if
1 < ρπ < 1+2( 1+β)
σc
γ
This completes the proof.
6.5 Proof of Proposition 3
First, we reduce the system in inﬂation, output and real wealth into a two dimensional
system in inﬂation and real wealth only. For that, write the real wealth equation of













Moreover, the FOC for real wealth in the next period, b at+1, can similarly be solved for













Inserting these two expressions into the IS (or consumption Euler) equation, we end
up in a 2 × 2 system in a, π and the policy instrument R







−σcβEtb πt+1 =χω1σb at − (χω1σ + σc)b πt + χω1
R
R − 1
b Rt + σcχb µt
We investigate interest rate rules represented by
b Rt = ρab at + ρπb πt
For the local stability analysis we have to investigate only the non-stochastic part of
the dynamic system. Therefore, our results also hold for any interest rate rule that
depends on current or past values of the exogenous shock processes. The deterministic











































































S i n c ew eh a v eo n ef o r w a r d - l o o k i n ga n do n eb a c k w a r d - l o o k i n gv a r i a b l e ,t h es y s t e mi s
determinate if one eigenvalue of M is larger than one in absolute value, while the other





















− (ρa + ρπ)
γ
σcσ(R − 1)





σ (R − 1) + ρaR
σ(R − 1) + ρa
Since f is concave and f (0) > 0if ρa is positive, we have one eigenvalue between zero
and one and one eigenvalue larger than one if f (1) < 0. This condition is
σ (R − 1)(1 + β)+ρa (β + R)






























This proves the ﬁrst part of the condition in proposition 1.
Note that if f (−1) < 0, we have one eigenvalue smaller than −1 and one eigenvalue
between −1 and 0. This condition, that also ensures determinacy, can be written as
σ(R − 1)(1 + β)+ρa (β + R)





























1 − (R − 1)(σ − 1)
σ (R − 1)
!
This completes the proof.
356.6 Proof of Corollary 1
It follows directly from proposition 2 that an active interest rate rule together with a









Using the expression for the slope of the Phillips curve (χω1) and the steady state
condition of the real interest rate, this condition can be written as
β
¯ π − β







(1 − φ)(1− βφ)
Since
β
¯ π − β
< (σ − 1) +
β

















1−φ is a suﬃcient condition for (51).
6.7 Proof of Proposition 4
The central bank sets the interest rate b Rt in period t, so that the nominal return on
a government bond bought in t and paid back in t +1is not known in t. Formally,
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.
The FOC with respect to b πt, b yt, b at+1,a n db Rt are
−b πt + φ1t−1σ
−1
c − φ2t + φ2t−1 − σφ3t =0, (52)
−αb xt − φ1t + β











¯ R − 1
=0. (55)
It can immediately be seen that (54) and (55) imply φ3t =0 ∀t>t 0 and hence
φ1t =0 ∀t. Moreover, as φ1t0−1 =0by construction, (55) also implies that φ3t0 =0 .
We can rewrite the FOC on output and inﬂation as
−b πt − φ2t + φ2t−1 =0,
−αb yt + φ2tχω1 =0.
Finally, eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, using that φ2t0−1 =0and deﬁning γ =
χω1 yields the targeting rule
b yt − b yt−1 =−
γ
α





This completes the proof.
6.8 Optimal interest rates in the C model
With the functional form for the targeting rule one can easily derive an analytical
solution for an interest rate rule in the C model (see, Clarida et al. 1999). First,












χb µt, with γ = χω1. (56)



















37The solution to this second order stochastic diﬀerence equation is given by














which is stable as 0 < δ < 1 holds. Iterating (57) one period ahead and taking
expectations gives































¢ b µt. (59)
The fundamentals based optimal interest rate rule under commitment can then be
derived from inserting (57) to (59) into the IS curve and solving for b Rt :
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